Has the Internet Truly Revolutionized Everyday Life?
*Originally submitted in April 2025 for the Media, Technology, and Everyday Life course in fulfillment of the MSC Media and Communications program at the London School of Economics.
Question: Critically discuss the claim that the internet has led to a revolution in the way we conduct our everyday lives.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, especially in Western society, many debates have centered around the internet and its impact on not just politics, economics, and society, but our everyday lives. Often, there is reference to a “revolution” as a result of the implementation and subsequent adoption of the internet. While many may agree with this assessment on the surface, the claim requires deeper historical context around technological innovation, what is really meant by the term revolution, and a closer look at how much everyday life has actually changed as a direct result of the internet. In this paper I will provide the aforementioned context, attempt to parse out what the term revolution implies, and examine case studies related to the internet and everyday life, especially in relation to sociability and time pressure. Ultimately, while technological innovations such as the internet have led to evolutions and new considerations around sociability and time pressure in our everyday lives, there are broader interests and systems at play that challenge claims to a real internet “revolution.”
Technological Innovation and Historical Context
In order to discuss a potential internet revolution, it is important to understand broader trends in technological innovation and provide historical context for these claims. Winner (1984) uses the term “mythinformation” to describe the promise that widespread adoption of technology will lead to an inevitably improved or utopian society, functioning as a great equalizer (p. 87). Throughout history, revolutionary claims have been made about dozens of innovations including the factory system, railroads, the telephone, electricity, the automobile, airplanes, radio, television, nuclear power, and more (Winner, 1984, p. 87). Previous revolutionary claims were made going back to the Industrial Revolution, up to the Computer Revolution, Information Superhighway, and Information Revolution. Computer “enthusiasts” used the term revolution as a “metaphor” to “suggest a drastic upheaval” with utopian outcomes (Winner, 1984, p. 84). Conceptions of an information society were rooted in ideas of “post industrialism” from the 1960s and 1970s that imagined a society which emphasized “service” and “leisure” over industrial capitalism (Lyon, 1988, p. 2). The computer was seen as central to this impending “revolution,” which would shift society away from labor and capitalism as central commodities of the economy and towards knowledge and information; in this scenario, increased knowledge implied increased power (Lyon, 1988, p. 3).
In addition to identifying previous claims to technical revolutions, it is also important to consider that change is cumulative, not all at once (Curran, 2016). Many scholars in the field of innovation studies refer to long-wave theory, defined by Linstone & Devezas (2012) as periods of innovation that alternate between surges and lulls (p. 414). These step-changes include down periods, during which there is a rise in basic innovation, which then leads to a recovery through “improvement innovations, commercial introduction…and widespread adoption” (Linstone & Devezas, 2012, p. 414). An oft-cited example is the boom of inventions and basic innovations borne out of the Great Depression, including radar, television, electronics, computers, and other technology (Linstone & Devezas, 2012, p. 414). The gradual development, diffusion, and adoption of dozens of technologies and communication tools have evolved and contributed to the internet, from letter-writing and telegrams to the telephone and e-mail (Anderson & Tracey, 2001). The form may have changed, but the activity of “interpersonal social communication” has largely remained the same (Anderson & Tracey, 2001, p. 475).
Revolutions and the Internet
With a (brief) understanding of the historical context, we can now consider the specific characteristics of the internet revolution, and what is implied by the term revolution itself. For many, the internet was seen as the complete manifestation of the promises of the “information society” (Selwyn et al., 2005, p. 5). It would become a utopian site of both consumption (of digitized music, hard goods, banking, etc.) and production (of “web-based material” and other creative endeavors), and democratize society by increasing access to information, improving political participation, and creating a “global village” where everyone online could connect with one another, regardless of physical location (Curran, 2016; Lyon, 1988; Selwyn et al., 2005, p. 6; Winner, 1984, p. 85). As Curran (2016) summarizes, “It was assumed that the distinctive technological attributes of the internet–its interactivity, global reach, cheapness, speed, networking facility, storage capacity and alleged uncontrollability–would change the world beyond all recognition” (p. 1). These utopian visions, however, fall too strongly on the side of technological determinism, and fail to consider the political, economic, and sociocultural contexts in which information and communication technologies (ICTs) exist (Curran, 2016; Kingma & Boersma, 2002; Lyon, 1988).
It is imperative to examine these utopian and revolutionary claims and understand who benefits from them, how they impact power dynamics, and how they might actually serve to reinforce the status quo. Modern computers exist as a result of military inventions, there is major capitalist interest in computing technology and subsequent emerging markets, and government interest in data capture and surveillance made possible by ICTs (Lyon, 1988; Selwyn et al., 2005). Class differences also do not disappear as a result of ICTs, and the internet has actually widened the gap and reinforced the existing power imbalance between large and small companies (Curran, 2016; Lyon, 1988). Three major areas of concern regarding an internet revolution, as identified by Winner (1984), include: data tracking, activity monitoring, and surveillance, impact on human sociability and a power imbalance resulting from decreased face-to-face interaction and local community involvement, and basic structures of political order and the power of omnipresent, transnational corporations. Hopes for reinvigorated democratic participation fail to consider issues of censorship and authoritarian control, just as hopes for a global village fail to consider inequality of access and participation (Curran, 2016). As many scholars assert, it is clear that the internet has the potential for all of these positive impacts, but change comes from society and imagined uses do not necessarily translate into practice (Bertel, 2016; Curran, 2016).
The Internet and Everyday Life
So far, I have discussed an internet “revolution” on a larger scale, and the utopian visions for macro-level economics, politics, society, and culture. The central question to be examined here, however, asks how the internet really impacts everyday life. As Huang & Miao (2021) remind us, even if users and ICTs remain the same, our social contexts and media interactions are constantly evolving, causing us to re-evaluate how specific media fit into our daily lives, if at all (p. 180). Further, it is not just a question of access, but what people do with that access; in reality, there is no such thing as the “average Internet user” (Anderson & Tracey, 2001, p. 462). Those born since 1980 have been classified as “digital natives,” representing a generation of citizens who view technology as essential to their existence, rather than a tool to be utilized occasionally (Selwyn, 2009, p. 365). On the one hand, the “empowered digital native” sees individuals as benefiting from an ever-expanding interconnected internet that enables multitasking and endless possibilities for communication (Selwyn, 2009, pp. 366-367). Alternatively, the “disempowered digital native” may experience the dangers and risks associated with tech use, such as a “dumbing-down” of knowledge and learning, decreases in independent critical thinking, socialization and community participation, and other physical, emotional, and sexual risks (Selwyn, 2009).
When talking about the internet and everyday life, we must consider how it impacts all people. Internet use is contingent upon a variety of factors such as race, class, gender, age, education level, and health status (Selwyn et al., 2005). This makes it hard to measure ICT use, as it differs by person, and technologies and social norms are constantly evolving. One early-2000s study examining internet use among adults in the UK, for example, found that 92% of those surveyed “reported the potential to access a computer,” but only 13% of overall respondents were classified as “broad frequent users” (Selwyn et al., 2005, pp. 9-10). Even for broad frequent users, the internet was largely used to supplement offline activities and interests, rather than replacing hobbies, further illustrating that technologies are often adapted to fit into our existing structures of everyday life (Selwyn et al., 2005, p. 13). In the United States, 96% of adults today report using the internet, with 98-99% of those aged 18-64 reporting using the internet (Pew Research Center, 2024). However, this does not tell us how, where, and when people are using the internet and what that means for their everyday lives. In the following sections, I will provide a more micro-level examination of how the internet has impacted sociability and time pressure in everyday life.
Sociability
As discussed above, utopian visions of the internet revolution saw it as a site for global connection and interactivity. Conversely, many have raised concerns that increased internet use would result in decreased sociability and face-to-face interaction. Historically, similar concerns surfaced regarding the adoption of the telephone, television and broadcast, and the automobile (Bakardjieva, 2005; Haddon, 2004). Specifically in the UK, the rise of telephony resulted in pressure to manage social relations and unwanted social contact, including calls at times that were inconvenient and disruptive to other activities (Haddon, 2004). Similarly, worries surfaced that television would decrease sociability within the home, and draw the middle class out of public spaces and into the private (Bakardjieva, 2005; Haddon, 2004). When examining sociability and the internet, it is important to acknowledge that not all activity online is solitary; in fact, a lot of time spent online is social (Haddon, 2004, p. 65). Activities that young people engage with online are predominantly game-playing, talking to friends, and watching or retrieving content (Selwyn, 2009). Additionally, those who are already less sociable offline may have higher internet use–we cannot necessarily say that one caused the other (Haddon, 2004, p. 66).
One aspect to consider is the quality of interactions online, instead of simply time spent (Haddon, 2004, p. 66). Turkle’s (2011) study regarding adolescent internet use found there were pros and cons to having a vast, but weak, network online (weak ties) or cultivating fewer, but stronger, relationships offline (strong ties). Further, adolescents in this study reported feeling a lack of spontaneity as a result of the internet, and found that communication was largely used for planning and coordinating offline activities, rather than chatting just to chat (Turkle, 2011). Many teens viewed online communication as inherently performative and lacking authenticity (Turkle, 2011, p. 271). Some scholars have found that young adults use social media to gather online information about potential friends’ social and political feelings in order to determine the trajectory of their offline friendships, potentially contributing to ideological polarization and the formation of echo chambers (Standlee, 2019). With a decrease in weak ties, offline social networks may begin to resemble the homogeneity of online networks (Standlee, 2019, p. 777). However, some have found ICT use to positively augment offline activities, rather than replace it, contributing to an ease of coordination in making offline social plans, and acquiring information about hobbies and interests such as sporting events and concerts (Vilhelmson, 2018, p. 2902).
We must also consider the realities of people’s digital technology use, keeping in mind that digital inclusion and exclusion, as well as technology adoption, varies by socioeconomic status, gender, social class, and geography, leading to inequalities in access and engagement (Selwyn, 2009, p. 372). Debates around sociability on the internet frequently establish a dichotomy between virtual and real, and public and private, which is not necessarily helpful (Bakardjieva, 2005, p. 186). Each user comes to the internet with their own experiences, positionality, and uses for the internet (Bakardjieva, 2005; Huang & Miao, 2021). Age is typically found to be the strongest predictor of attitude towards new technology, with younger generations placing more value on it and being earlier adopters of new tech (Räsänen, 2008). In 1999, Räsänen (2008) found that those with higher levels of education and from upper or upper-middle class backgrounds evaluated ICTs more positively; this, however, leveled out significantly in the follow-up 2004 study. This change in attitudes may reflect social changes in the integration of ICTs into the workplace and education (Räsänen, 2008).
In Bakardjieva’s 2005 home ethnography of “low-tech” and low-income users in Vancouver, she identified a wide range of positions users took in relation to the internet. Some individuals’ use was classified as “infosumption,” wherein users did not see the value in online discussion, found most of it low-quality, and typically just used the internet to gather news and information from official and verified sources (Bakardjieva, 2005). Others, however, found internet forums useful to connect over specific experiences like raising children with ADD, engaging in hobby forums, or entering into safe, virtual experiences for people experiencing similar sensitive situations offline (Bakardjieva, 2005). In most cases, though, this interaction came from very specific needs, helped to supplement face-to-face interaction that wasn’t possible at the time, and communication online eventually died out (Bakardjieva, 2005). It is clear that sociability in relation to the internet is difficult to measure, and is specific to each individual user or non-user. In this way, we cannot claim a definite “revolution” in everyday social interaction as a result of the internet.
Time Pressure
Similar to sociability, many positive and negative ideas about the internet and time are prevalent in modern discussions. Optimists saw the internet as a tool that could help us automate much of our lives, allowing us more time to dedicate to leisure activities, while pessimists saw the potential for increased internet use to take away from offline activities. Once again, it is important to understand the broader contexts that have impacted time structures in recent decades. Even going back to the invention of the clock, time has often been socially constructed through “things” (Kingma & Boersma, 2002, p. 353). “Structural shifts in the labor market,” increased involvement in higher education, varying unemployment rates, increased individualization, and younger generations marrying and having children later in life have contributed to changes in free-time use among younger generations (Vilhelmson et al., 2018). Additional social structures constraining time include when businesses are open, school and work hours, social norms, and identifying windows when others are able to communicate with you (Haddon, 2004). Data at the turn of the century has shown that those in the workforce today actually benefit from relatively more leisure time, but there is an increased feeling of time pressure (Haddon, 2004, 92.)
With the rise of ICTs and the Web, multiple activities can take place at the same time and we can “be” in multiple places at the same time, resulting in what Kingma & Boersma (2002) refer to as “timeless time” (p. 354). Additionally, with increased flexibility in areas such as working and shopping, activities become more fragmented, which can be overwhelming and make it harder to coordinate with those in our social networks (Haddon, 2004). There is also increased pressure to fit more activity into short periods of time in order to generate periods of relaxation, leading to greater disparity in the level of activity in time blocks (also referred to as “hot and cold spots") (Haddon, 2004). With an increase in mobile device and internet adoption, users are increasingly untethered from space and time; for example, we might not physically have to be at the office “on time,” but we are expected to be reachable via ICTs during work hours, or even outside of structured work hours (Kingma & Boersma, 2002, p. 355). However, similar sentiments were felt with the rise of telework, which allowed for flexibility in remote work, but tended to blur the boundaries between home life and domestic life (Haddon, 2004).
As touched on above, spending more time online does not necessarily mean taking away from time spent on other activities; people might just have more free time, or what we might refer to as “time richness” (Vilhelmson et al., 2018, p. 2899). Examining young Swedish ICT and Internet users from 1990-2011 and the impact on free time use and activities, Vilhelmson et al. (2018) found a decrease in visits (meeting in public or private spaces), but an increase in conversation (offline and face-to-face), and no significant changes for activities like sports, outdoor recreation, entertainment, culture, and volunteer work. These offline activities actually increased for those who were “time-rich,” but generally declined for those classified as “time-poor” (Vilhelmson et al., 2018, p. 2911). In a UK-based longitudinal study of 1,000 households, no one clear factor emerged that had been dramatically reduced or displaced as a result of internet use, as well as no firm sense that the internet had been particularly disruptive (Anderson & Tracey, 2001). Those who gained internet access between the first and second study did spend more time engaging with hobbies via the web, but examples were mostly on the micro-level, such as watching a cooking program on TV and subsequently using the internet to look up the recipe afterwards (Anderson & Tracey, 2001, p. 468).
Those who fit into the category of “digital natives” may feel more time pressures as a result of ICTs, but they have also developed strategies to negotiate use. Turkle (2011) reported that teens felt pressure to respond to text messages immediately, unless they found themselves in “dire” circumstances, such as having no service. As one teen asserted, “Texting is pressure” (Turkle, 2011, p. 266). This same pressure to respond immediately, however, was also felt with the adoption of previous technologies such as the answering machine and e-mail (Haddon, 2004). Huang & Miao (2021) also found that younger users of China’s WeChat app experienced feelings of time pressure, with the app facilitating constant connection as a space used for socializing, personal use, work, and information gathering. However, users developed their own strategies to negotiate use and set boundaries around how much time, when, and where specific features of the app were being used (Huang & Miao, 2021). These included physically rearranging the placement of the app on their mobile devices to make it less accessible, or relegating the app or specific features of it to specific functions such as work or socialization (Huang & Miao, 2021). While it may be increasingly hard to live in the present when we feel compelled to fill each spare moment of time with the use of ICTs, it is again imperative to consider the contexts in which ICTs exist, and individual user agency (Kingma & Boersma, 2002). Similarly to sociability and the internet, it would be difficult to claim that the internet alone has revolutionized the way we experience time in everyday life.
Conclusion
While many may be quick to agree with the claim that the internet has led to a revolution in the way we conduct our everyday lives, it is clear that the question is not so simple. To evaluate this claim requires a historical examination of technological innovation, an understanding of broader political, economic, and sociocultural contexts, and insight into the word “revolution” itself. Revolutions imply utopian outcomes, and often exist as visions for regular citizens to buy into in order for those in power to remain in power. While the internet has certainly affected the way we conduct everyday activities, revolutionary claims are difficult to prove. As exemplified through many case studies, there is no singular, concrete understanding of how the internet has really impacted sociability and time pressures in everyday life. Further, these elements of life are hard to quantify, each research method comes with its pros and cons, and much of internet use is shaped by the lifeworld of every individual user. As summed up by Curran (2016), “Initial assessments of the impact of the internet were based on inferences derived from its technology…but they all had one enormous error at their center. They failed to recognize that the impact of technology is filtered through the structures and processes of society” (p. 33). As revolutionary claims and moral panics surrounding new technologies such as Artificial Intelligence continue to emerge, citizens would do well to keep this in mind.
References
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Bertel, T. F. (2016). ‘Why would you want to know?’: The reluctant use of location sharing via check-ins on Facebook among Danish youth. Convergence, 22(2), 162–176. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354856514543250
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Huang, Y., & Miao, W. (2021). Re-domesticating social media when it becomes disruptive: Evidence from China’s “super app” WeChat. Mobile Media & Communication, 9(2), 177–194. https://doi.org/10.1177/2050157920940765
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Pew Research Center. (2024, November 13). Internet, Broadband Fact Sheet. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/
Räsänen, P. (2008). The aftermath of the ICT revolution? Media and communication technology preferences in Finland in 1999 and 2004. New Media & Society, 10(2), 225–245. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444807086471
Selwyn, N., Gorard, S., & Furlong, J. (2005). Whose Internet is it Anyway?: Exploring Adults’ (Non)Use of the Internet in Everyday Life. European Journal of Communication, 20(1), 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323105049631
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Standlee, A. (2019). Friendship and online filtering: The use of social media to construct offline social networks. New Media & Society, 21(3), 770–785. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818806844
Turkle, S. (2011). Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other. Basic Books. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=684281
Vilhelmson, B., Elldér, E., & Thulin, E. (2018). What did we do when the Internet wasn’t around? Variation in free-time activities among three young-adult cohorts from 1990/1991, 2000/2001, and 2010/2011. New Media & Society, 20(8), 2898–2916. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817737296
Winner, L. (1984). Mythinformation in the high-tech era. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 4(6), 582-596. https://doi.org/10.1177/027046768400400609 (Original work published 1984)